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Abstract 
 
Understanding what determines Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows remains a primary concern 
of economists and policy makers; yet the uncertainty surrounding FDI theories and empirical 
approaches has created ambiguity regarding the determinants of FDI. This paper applies Extreme 
Bounds Analysis to identify the robust determinants of FDI using panel data covering 168 countries 
from 1970 to 2006. We consider 58 potential economic, geographic and political determinants and 
find that almost one third are robust, including: openness, education, government spending, corporate 
tax rate, infrastructure, experience of conflict, democratic governance, natural resources, geographic 
location, number of borders, coastal location and language. 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding what determines Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) remains a primary concern of 
economists and policy makers. However, the main determinants of FDI are still poorly understood 
because of the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding both theories and empirical approaches to FDI. 
Given the sheer amount of possible determinants that theory and intuition suggest, it is not possible to 
nest all of them in a grand specification in a general-to-specific approach; thus, it is difficult to know 
which regressors are truly significant and which ones appear to be so as a result of omitted variable 
bias. “Extreme Bounds Analysis” (EBA), first developed by Leamer (1983, 1985) and Leamer and 
Leonard (1983), provides robustness and sensitivity tests of explanatory variables in regressions, in 
order to determine which regressors are robust and which are fragile. Widely applied in cross-country 
growth regressions, the procedure has not as yet found widespread application in the analysis of the 
determinants of FDI: As far as we are aware, only Chakrabarti (2001), Moosa and Cardak (2006) and 
Moosa (2009) have used EBA to identify the robust determinants of FDI. 
 
This paper undertakes an exhaustive search for robust determinants of FDI by applying EBA, as 
developed by Sala-i-Martin (1997). We advance the literature on the determinants of FDI in several 
ways. First, we use a larger sample and a more comprehensive set of variables than in previous work 
on FDI. We include all possible determinants of FDI suggested by previous studies, which we group 
into two categories: “economic” and “geopolitical” country characteristics. In addition, the paper 
examines the role of geographical and institutional variables that have not been adequately explored 
in the current literature using the EBA method. Second, we use a panel data set, while previous 
applications of EBA (the three studies mentioned above) are only applied in a cross-section context; 
ours is the first study to apply EBA with a panel data set to the determinants of FDI. Third, this panel 
data set is one of the most extensive used in FDI analysis. We show that almost one third of the 
previously suggested FDI determinants are robust. The next section outlines the EBA methodology 
and discusses the data and variables to be used in each EBA application. The results are discussed in 
section 3 while section 4 concludes the paper. 
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2. Estimation methodology 
 
2.1 The EBA approach 
 
Following standard practice in conducting EBA, we estimate equation (1). For each country i, and 
each specific regression jk (where j[1,M], k[1,K] as specified below), we have:  
 
(
FDI
Y
)
it
=∝ij+ 𝛃jk𝐗it + γjkIkit + 𝜹jk𝚭jit
𝒌 + εijt (1) 
 
Where (
FDI
Y
)
i
 is  FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP into country i. The explanatory variables on the 
right-hand side are divided in three groups: The first is n standard (‘core’) explanatory variables that 
are included in every single regression (in addition to a constant) denoted 
𝐗it = (𝑋1𝑖𝑡 𝑋2𝑖𝑡 … 𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡), where, 𝛃jk = (𝛽1𝑘 𝛽2𝑘 … 𝛽𝑛𝑘)
′ . Following Levine and Renelt 
(1992), we use a set of exactly three core variables, 𝐗it , that are always kept in the equation. The 
second is Ikit, which is the k
th
 variable of interest whose robustness we are testing and is a single 
variable selected from the set of variables 𝚭it, where the latter is a Kx1 vector containing all of the 
possible determinants of FDI that are not included in 𝐗it . Following Leamer (1983), we consider all 
of the remaining variables in 𝚭it (one at a time and each in turn) as Ikit. 𝚭itis identified from a wide 
range of past studies as including potentially important candidate determinants (beyond 𝐗it ) that need 
to be controlled for in FDI regressions. The third is 𝚭jit
𝒌 , which is a 3x1 vector of exactly three 
additional control variables chosen from the pool of possible (non-core) explanatory variables, 𝚭it, 
that do not include Ikit. For each k, all the possible combinations of the remaining K-1 variables in the 
predetermined pool of variables 𝚭it  is considered; there are 𝑀 [=
(K−1)!
(K−1−3)!×3!
] such combinations. 
Further, j=1,2,….M, where j denotes the jth estimated combination of the variables: the jth model. The 
robustness of each variable of interest, Ikit, is tested while controlling for 𝐗it  and all the possible 
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combinations 𝚭jit
𝒌 . Exactly three variables are included in 𝚭jit
𝒌 , partly to follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) 
original methodology and also to avoid the perception of data mining or selective reporting of results.
2
 
There are M possible combinations for each of the k=1,2,…,K variables of interest, giving a total of 
𝑀 × 𝐾 possible regressions. Finally, εit is an error term. The aim is to investigate the effects on the 
statistical significance of γjk , the coefficient on the k
th
 variable of interest, when varying the 
combinations of three variables included in 𝚭jit
𝒌 . The (j = 1, 2, … , 𝑀 ) estimated coefficients for each 
Ikit(γ̂jk)  and 𝐗it (?̂?jk) are recorded. The standard deviation of these 𝑀  coefficient estimates is 
calculated for each Ikit and is denoted as σ̂k.  
 
Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) version of EBA, which we follow here, is based on the fraction of the 
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of γ̂jk  that lies to the right of zero.
3
 If this fraction is 
sufficiently large (small) for a positive (negative) relationship, Ikitis regarded as robust: specifically, if 
more than 90% (less than 10%) of the CDF for γ̂jk is above zero, Ikit is robust. We apply two variants 
of Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) EBA, being the normal and non-normal CDF methods. Sala-i-Martin’s 
method involves the calculation of a CDF for each variable of interest, Ikit, using the (j = 1, 2, … , 𝑀) 
estimated coefficients, γ̂jk, and estimated coefficient variances, σ̂jk
2 .Using these values the mean of γ̂jk 
is constructed as the average of each of the M γ̂jk, thus, γ̅k = ∑
1
M
γ̂jk
M
j=1 .
4
 Similarly, the average of the 
coefficient variances are σ̅k
2 = ∑
1
M
σ̂jk
2M
j=1 .
5
 Assuming the γjk  have a standard normal distribution 
                                                 
2
We apply EBA with an intercept, the variable of interest, Ikit, the same three core variables in all regressions, 
𝐗it , and allowing the 𝚭jit
𝒌  variables to come in combinations of exactly three, giving seven explanatory variables 
plus an intercept in all estimated models. This follows almost all of the growth literature where at least seven 
explanatory variables are included in reported models. Fixing the number of regressors that appear in each 
regression has a direct effect on the size of the estimated coefficients (see Leon-Gonzalez and Montolio, 2004) 
and it limits the number of the models that are explored.   
3
In early versions of the test, Leamer (1983, 1985) and Leamer and Leonard (1983), a coefficient is robust if its 
Extreme Bounds (EB) are of the same sign. The EB are defined as: LowerEB ≡ γ̂k
min − 2σ̂k  and UpperEB ≡
γ̂k
max + 2σ̂k , where γ̂k
max  and γ̂k
min
 are the highest and lowest values of γ̂jk , respectively. In our case, 
unsurprisingly, no variables showed up as robust according to this very restrictive criterion. 
4
 We are careful to exclude regressions where the regressions do not estimate. 
5
Note that because of a missing data problem, we do not attach different weights to different models’ 
parameters. Furthermore, the integrated likelihood (which has been suggested as a weight) may not be a good 
indicator of the probability that a model is the true model (see Sala-i-Martin, 1997). For these reasons, we are 
unable to use the extension of this approach called Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE), 
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across the M models, the CDF is evaluated at zero as Φ(0|γ̅k, σ̅k
2), where Φ denotes the cumulative 
density based on the standard normal distribution. Finally, the CDF(0) statistics indicates the larger of 
the areas under the density function either side of zero [hence 0.5 ≤ CDF(0) ≤ 1], that is: 
 
CDF(0) = Φ(0|γ̅k, σ̅k
2) 𝑖𝑓 Φ(0|γ̅k, σ̅k
2) ≥ 0.5
CDF(0) = 1 − Φ(0|γ̅k, σ̅k
2) 𝑖𝑓 Φ(0|γ̅k, σ̅k
2) < 0.5
} (2) 
 
According to Sala-i-Martin (1997), if the γjk are not normally distributed across the M modelsfor any 
particular k, CDF(0) can be calculated using the individual CDFs for each of the M regressions. The 
CDF for the j
th
 regression is denoted as: Fj(0|𝛾jk, ?̂?jk
2 ) where: 
 
Fj(0|γ̂jk, σ̂jk
2 ) = Φj(0|γ̂jk, σ̂jk
2 ) 𝑖𝑓 Φj(0|γ̂jk, σ̂jk
2 ) ≥ 0.5
Fj(0|γ̂jk, σ̂jk
2 ) = 1 − Φj(0|γ̂jk, σ̂jk
2 ) 𝑖𝑓 Φj(0|γ̂jk, σ̂jk
2 ) < 0.5
} (3) 
 
The aggregate “non-normal” CDF, denoted CDF(0)∗ , is calculated as the average of the (j =
1, 2, … , 𝑀) individual CDFs (3), thus: 
 
CDF(0)∗ =
1
M
∑ Fj(0|γ̂jk, σ̂jk
2 )Mj=1  (4) 
 
Variables are regarded as robust when both CDFs are at least 0.90. The degree of robustness is 
assigned as follows: robust at the 1% level when CDF(0) ≥ 0.99  or CDF(0)∗ ≥ 0.99  (which is 
denoted with ***), robust at the 5% level when either CDF ≥ 0.95 (**), robust at the 10% level when 
both CDF ≥ 0.90 (*).6 A variable is regarded as a “fragile” determinant of FDI otherwise.7 
                                                                                                                                                        
introduced by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). We have also not followed Granger and Uhlig’s (1990) criterion 
whereby regressions are included if their R
2
 is higher than a threshold, or otherwise discarded; the dual reason is 
the arbitrariness of the threshold and the ‘knife-edge’ nature of the criterion (e..g., a regression would fully 
count if its R
2
=0.6 – say – but be completely discarded if R2=0.59).  
6
 We take 0.90 as the posterior probability threshold following Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Fernandez et al. (2001). 
7
Exactly the same procedure is applied to (and statistics reported for) the coefficient estimates ?̂?jk in our first 
EBA application. 
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We carry out two applications of the EBA procedure: firstly using only economic variables (results 
reported in sub-section 3.1) and then augmenting the dataset with the inclusion of political and 
geographic variables (sub-section 3.2). In the first of these applications, we test all possible variables 
considered in both 𝐗it  and 𝚭it for robustness. In all applications, we report the results based on Sala-i-
Martin’s (1997) method assuming both normal and non-normal CDFs (cf. 2 and 4 respectively).  
 
2.2. Data 
 
We consider 58 potential economic, political and geographical explanatory factors.
8
 The definitions of 
the variables used are given in Table 1. Data were constructed from a number of sources, including 
World Development Indicators 2006. The political and institutional variables are obtained from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and we construct the geographical dummy variables. Our 
sample is an unbalanced annual panel dataset for 168 economies over the period 1970–2006.  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
2.3. Estimation issues 
 
Our first application of EBA that considers only economic determinants employs the fixed-effects 
estimator in all regressions; this is so as it is more likely to ensure consistent estimates than the 
random-effects estimator.
9
 However, the random-effects estimator is employed in our second EBA 
application that incorporates economic, geographical and political variables because some of these 
variables are perfectly collinear with the (cross-sectional) fixed-effects. 
 
                                                 
8
 See Chakrabarti (2001, Table 1) for a detailed discussion of empirical findings on the determinants of FDI. 
Table 1 in his paper indicates how ambiguous the evidence is. 
9
Application of the Hausman test and F-test in initial modelling suggested the use of the fixed-effects estimator. 
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A potential problem for our estimates is endogeneity, which causes OLS estimators to be biased and 
inconsistent. We identify three potential determinants as being the most likely to be endogenously 
determined with FDI as the current account balance (% of GDP- CAB), GDP growth (GDPG) and 
per-capita GDP (GDPP).
10
 We therefore treat CAB, GDPG and GDPP as potentially endogenous in 
our EBA applications because the costs of incorrectly treating exogenous variables as endogenous are 
much lower than incorrectly assuming endogenous variables are exogenous. This means that these 
three variables are excluded from 𝐗it and 𝚭it in all EBA applications and are only considered as Ikit 
variables. Hence, the only inference that could be affected by endogeneity bias is when these 
covariates are considered as the variable of interest.
 
 
3. Results  
 
This section presents the empirical results of our two EBA applications. In sub-section 3.1, we discuss 
the results of the EBA applied only to economic variables; in sub-section 3.2, we discuss the EBA 
application involving economic, political and geographical variables. 
 
3.1. EBA using only economic variables 
 
The 30 potential economic determinants of FDI that we consider in our first EBA application are 
listed in the left-hand side of Table1.The following three core variables, 𝐗it , that are always kept in 
the equation are: openness (denoted OPEN), inflation (INFL), and tax on trade (TTRADE). These 
core variables are chosen because they have been shown to be robustly linked to FDI in previous 
empirical work (as well as in our initial experiments) and we do not expect them to be endogenous. 
All of the remaining 27 economic determinants are considered as the variable of interest, Ikit , 
however only 24 of these are included in 𝚭jit
𝒌  because we are seeking to minimise the impact of any 
                                                 
10
 To confirm endogeneity we applied the Wu-Hausman test based upon a fixed-effects estimated example 
regression. The results, available upon request, suggest failure of weak exogeneity for these variables.  
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endogeneity bias that the current account balance (CAB), GDP growth (GDPG) and per-capita GDP 
(GDPP) variables may cause.
11
 
 
Tables 2 to 5 summarise the results of our first EBA application. The first column reports the variable 
of interest under consideration. For each Ikit variable four sets of EBA statistics are reported: one set 
for the Ikit variable (reported in Table 5) and one set for each of the 3 core variables: OPEN (Table 2), 
INFL (Table 3) and TTRADE (Table 4).
12
 Some models cannot be estimated due to insufficient 
observations and this causes some variation in the number of regressions run for the differentIkit. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
The column headed “AVG coeft” gives the variable’s coefficient averaged over the number of 
regressions used in the EBA application. Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) non-normal CDF [denoted CDF(0)∗] 
and normal CDF [CDF(0)] statistics are also reported in the tables. Bold emphasis indicates that a 
variable is robust based upon Sala-i-Martin’s criteria. For a variable to be robust it must have a CDF 
of at least 0.90 according to both normal and non-normal criteria (the normal and non-normal CDF 
broadly yield the same inference) otherwise the variable is said to be fragile. 
 
                                                 
11
In our first EBA application, the variables in 𝚭it  have pairwise correlation coefficients that are (in all cases) 
below 0.5 in magnitude. This should limit the problem of multicollinearity which can adversely affect 
conclusions regarding robustness. 
12
In Tables 2 to 4, each core variable is tested for robustness with the test results specified in a disaggregated 
form for each of the non-core variables. In contrast, Table 5 assesses the robustness of the non-core variables of 
interest, Ikit. 
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Table 2 indicates that the core variable, Trade openness index (OPEN), is robust in 26 out of 27 sets 
of EBA results (the exception is when TIMEB is the variable of interest). This result is consistent with 
many previous studies that found openness toward trade to be a significant determinant of FDI (e.g. 
Chakrabarti, 2001; Moosa and Cardak, 2006). In all 27 cases OPEN has an average coefficient sign 
(“AVG coeft”) that is positive which is consistent with theoretical expectations. From Table 3the 
INFL core variable is robust in only one (RATIOT) of the 27 EBA sets and is a fragile determinant 
for the remaining 26 Ikit. The TTRADE core variable is robust in only one (CGD) of the 27 EBA sets 
and is a fragile determinant otherwise, see Table 4. This is considered as strong evidence against 
TTRADE and INFL being robust determinants of FDI. 
 
From Table 5 we see that eight non-core variables are unambiguously robust determinants of FDI 
because both of their CDFs exceed 0.90. These are current account balance (CAB), GDP growth rate 
(GDPG), GDP per capita (GDPP), highest marginal corporate tax rate (HMTAXCOR), outgoing FDI 
(FDIO), tertiary and secondary school enrolment (RATIOT and RATIOS, resp.) and Government 
final expenditure (GFE). The negative and robust coefficient of HMTAXCOR suggests that high 
corporate taxes in the host country will have a robust negative effect on FDI, in line with the finding 
of Becker et al. (2012). Government expenditure as a proportion of GDP (GFE) is also robust and has, 
on average, a negative sign, validating the critics of government  (see e.g. Mitchell, 2005; Sinn, 1995). 
The tertiary enrolment ratio (RATIOT) and secondary enrolment ratio (RATIOS) are both found to be 
robust determinants of FDI with generally positive coefficients, which are consistent with previous 
literature and implies that education attracts FDI.
13
 FDI outflows (FDIO) is another robust 
determinant of FDI inflows. This could be because the multinational corporations (MNCs) of 
developing countries may be both the recipients of incoming FDI and originators of outgoing FDI; 
thus FDI and FDIO may be positively correlated. Both GDPG and GDPP robustly and positively 
affect FDI. As these are measures of future prospects and market size and demand, this finding is 
consistent with theoretical expectations, however, we cannot rule out bi-directional causality. 
                                                 
13
See for instance the theoretical analysis of Lucas (1993) and the empirical findings of Zhang and Markusen 
(1999), Dunning (1988) and Noorbakhsh et al. (2001). 
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Additionally, we find that the current account balance (CAB) affects FDI, the negative sign is 
consistent with theory, however bi-directional or even reverse causality cannot be ruled out. In sum, 
all of the 9 robust variables (OPEN, GFE, FDIO, RATIOS, RATIOT, CAB, GDPG, GDPP, 
HMTAXCOR) have theoretically plausible (average) coefficient signs. However, we treat the finding 
of robustness for the three potentially endogenous variables CAB, GDPG and GDPP with caution and 
hesitate to conclude that our results offer strong support for it. 
 
Apart from these nine variables, all of the other variables in our first EBA application are fragile. 
Comparing our findings with previous applications of EBA to FDI provides interesting insights. 
Moosa and Cardak (2006) found telephone mainlines to be robust whereas we find it to be fragile in 
this application; however, we do find it to be a robust determinant in the next application when we 
consider both geopolitical and economic variables. Further, Moosa and Cardak found GDP growth 
and tertiary education enrolments to be fragile while we find these variables to be robust. Chakrabarti 
(2001) found openness to be robust as we do, though not GDP growth.  
 
3.2. EBA using economic, geographical and political variables 
 
In our second EBA applicationwe include OPEN, GFE and RATIOS as our core variables following 
the results of our first EBA. OPEN is chosen because it is the only core variable from our first EBA 
application that is robust. Since the other two core variables (INFL and TTRADE) are not robust in 
our first EBA application, we seek two different core variables; those should, firstly, be robust with an 
average coefficient sign that is consistent with theoretical expectations in the first EBA application 
and that have the highest value for CDF(0)∗; secondly, they must not be among the 3 potentially 
endogenous variables. The 3 variables with the highest values for CDF(0)∗  are GFE(CDF(0)∗ =
1.00), RATIOS (0.95) and CAB (0.95). Since we regard CAB as potentially endogenous we select the 
other 2 as core variables, along with OPEN, to be employed in our second EBA application. 
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We add 28 geographical and political variables (described on the right-hand side of Table 1) to the 
economic variables to be considered in the second EBA application, allowing us to test the robustness 
of an extended set of variables. The geopolitical variables are not included in the core set of variables, 
𝐗it, or the set of three 𝚭jit
𝒌
 variables (to help avoid multicollinearity); however, they are all considered 
(in turn) as the variable of interest, Ikit. All of the economic variables (except the 3 core variables) are 
considered (in turn) as Ikit and in 𝚭jit
𝒌  (except for the potentially endogenous variables, CAB, GDPG 
and GDPP, and the 3 core variables).
14
 The focus in this second application is to determine whether 
country specific institutions (such as democracy, rule of law, corruption, bureaucracy, ethnic and 
international conflict and type of political regime),
15
 cultural factors (languages) or geographical 
locations (number of boundaries, coastal location, abundance of natural resources, proximity to 
particular regions) can influence FDI. Many geographical and political/institutional factors have been 
conclusively linked to economic growth (e.g. Durlauf et al., 2005) and remain active areas of 
research. The results of our second EBA application are reported in Table 6. 
 
Ten of the 28 geopolitical variables are considered as robust determinants of FDI as both of their 
CDFs are at least 0.90. These include the dummies for: countries in the South Asia region (SA), 
countries in the East Asia and Pacific region (EAP), countries with more than 3 boundaries (GTBUN), 
countries that are not land-locked (LANDUNLOCKED), Spanish (SPN) and Arabic (ARB) speaking 
countries as well as nations with greater democratic accountability (DEMO). These seven 
determinants are all generally positively correlated with FDI inflows. The other three robust 
geopolitical variables are dummies for countries experiencing low international and internal conflict 
(CONFLICTINT) and economies with an abundance of the natural resources: oil (OILDUMMY) and 
gas (GASDUMMY).
16
 These three determinants are all generally negatively correlated with FDI 
                                                 
14
The maximum number of regressions estimated in the first and second EBA applications are 48576 and 
98164, respectively. However we only obtain results from 15148 and 85369 regressions, respectively. Thus, in 
the two EBA applications, we estimated 146740 models and obtain results from 100517.  
15
Political and other institutions are a vibrant area of research in growth theory and empirics (see e.g. Easterly 
and Levine, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2004; and Durlauf et al., 2005). 
16
Our results also show that the SSA (Sub-Saharan African region) and MENA (Middle East and North Africa) 
dummies are fragile determinants of FDI. One plausible explanation is the weak institutions in these regions. 
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inflows. 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
DEMO is a robust determinant with a generally positive coefficient sign, which is expected as 
democracy increases transparency and reduces arbitrariness and red tape (Jensen, 2008 and Li, 
2009).
17
 The Internal and external conflict variable (CONFLICTINT) is robust with a generally 
negative coefficient sign. This is consistent with a priori expectations as less conflict reduces 
incertitude amongst potential investors, which raises FDI. Hence, our results support the notion that 
an increase in institutional quality (as indicated by greater democracy and lower conflict) would 
strengthen incoming FDI; these results are consistent with previous analyses (e.g. Globerman and 
Shapiro, 2002; Sachs, 2003). It is noteworthy that various other variables whose relevance has been 
highlighted in the theory of growth, such as rule of law, corruption, bureaucracy, ethnic conflict or 
type of political regime, are fragile determinants of FDI.  
 
Our results also suggest that language is an important factor in attracting FDI. We found that countries 
where Arabic and Spanish are the main language have higher incoming FDI ceteris paribus. This 
result may be driven by the higher incoming FDI into countries such as the Middle East and Latin 
America, as opposed to others in Africa and elsewhere in which English or French are the official 
languages; dummies representing countries where English and French are the main language are 
found to be fragile. International languages such as English and to some extent French may play a role 
in attracting FDI; but they are often spoken by much of the population in countries where they are not 
the main language and this may help explain why countries where English and French are the main 
languages do not receive any significant increases in incoming FDI. We also find that coastal 
countries tend to attract more FDI: the dummy “LANDUNLOCKED”, indicating countries that are 
                                                 
17
 However, Asiedu and Lien (2011) find that democracy attracts FDI in countries where the share of natural 
resources in total exports is low, but has a negative effect on FDI in countries where exports are dominated by 
natural resources. This statement may to some extent explain why we did not find the SSA and MENA regions 
as robust determinants of FDI (the countries in these regions have weak democracy and their exports are 
dominated by natural resources – see the previous Footnote).  
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not landlocked, is a robust determinant with a generally positive sign. This is consistent with findings 
in growth empirics (Easterly and Levine, 2001). Furthermore, countries with more than 3 boundaries 
attract more FDI than those with fewer boundaries given the robust and generally positive coefficient. 
This is also in the spirit of the previous finding (the “landunlocked” feature): a country with more 
neighbours has more freedom to trade and, hence, better prospects for incoming FDI. While 
“landlockedness” has been emphasised in the past as a factor affecting growth and FDI, the finding 
that the numbers of borders affects FDI is, we believe, novel.   
 
Natural resource abundance in the form of oil and gas (OILDUMMY and GASDUMMY, respectively) 
are both found to be robust determinants of FDI with generally negative coefficient signs. This is a 
kind of “Dutch disease”, akin to that highlighted by Sachs and Warner (1995) in relation to growth; 
see also Tietenburg (2006). This reasoning will of course not apply to specifically resource-seeking 
firms, which would naturally be attracted by resource abundance; this would explain the inflows of 
FDI into the Arab Gulf and African countries. All other geopolitical variables exert only a fragile 
influence on FDI.  
 
From Table 6 we see that eight non-core economic variables are robust determinants of FDI: CAB, 
GDPG, GDPP, CGD, FDIO, INTERNET, RATIOT and TEL. These findings for economic variables 
are similar to those in Table 5 in that FDIO, RATIOT, CAB, GDPG and GDPP are found to be robust 
in both of our EBA applications - broadly confirming the robustness of these results. For economic 
variables the average coefficient signs are the same in Table 6 and Table 5 except for RATIOT which 
has a generally negative coefficient sign in Table 6; this change in coefficient sign between the two 
EBA applications may be due to RATIOS being a core variable in the second application and not the 
first. Table 6 suggests three additional robust economic variables, which are central government debt 
(CGD), internet use (INTERNET) and telephone mainline use (TEL). CGD appears as robust with a 
generally negative coefficient: this is expected, as debt may have a number of adverse consequences, 
such as inducing higher interest rates and raising default risk. The latter two capture communication 
  
 
14 
 
 
facilities. As expected an increase in internet and telephone use increases FDI inflows, as indicated by 
the generally positive coefficient signs for these variables. All of the other economic variables in our 
second EBA application are fragile.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We investigate the determinants of incoming Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) using Extreme Bounds 
Analysis (EBA) to address the issue of model uncertainty. We employ an unbalanced panel dataset 
covering 168 countries over the period 1970 to 2006. We consider 58 economic, geographical and 
political variables that have been previously proposed as determinants of FDI. As far as we are aware 
this is the largest set of variables and the largest coverage of data in any analysis of the determinants 
of FDI. Our EBA application to FDI further extends previous work in its use of a large panel dataset 
instead of just cross-sectional data which previous EBA analyses employ; and by the inclusion of 
political and geographical factors as well as economic variables. In these respects we believe our 
work significantly extends the existing literature that seeks to understand the determinants of FDI. We 
use Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) EBA approach to carry out two analyses: one with only economic 
variables using the fixed-effects estimator, and one that includes all our variables (economic, political 
and geographic) employing random-effects to avoid collinearity.  
 
In our first EBA application that only considers economic determinants we find that the following six 
variables (excluding the three potentially endogenous covariates) have a robust relationship (with 
average coefficient signs that are consistent with theoretical expectations) according to both of Sala-i-
Martin’s Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) criteria: Trade openness index, outgoing FDI, 
Government final expenditure (% of GDP), highest marginal corporate tax rate, tertiary and secondary 
school enrolment. However, the three variables current account balance, GDP growth rate and GDP 
per capita are robust if potentially subject to problems of endogeneity. Based upon this, we use Trade 
openness, Government final expenditure and the secondary school enrolment variables as the core 
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variables in our second EBA application that considers both economic and geopolitical determinants 
of FDI. 
 
According to both of Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) CDF criteria, our second EBA application reveals that 18 
of the 55 (non-core) variables are robust determinants of FDI. There are ten robust geopolitical 
determinants that suggest the following relations with inward FDI. Countries located in South Asia, 
East Asia and the pacific region, that have more than 3 boundaries, that are not land-locked, that are 
Spanish or Arabic speaking, that have greater democratic accountability and that experience less 
conflict attract more FDI. Natural resource abundance (in terms of oil and gas) has a negative impact 
on FDI. Additionally, excluding the three potentially endogenous variables, there are four robust 
(non-core) economic determinants of inward FDI in the second application whose average coefficient 
signs are consistent with theoretical expectations; these are Central Government debt, outgoing FDI, 
number of Internet users, and number of Telephone lines. Tertiary school enrolment is robust however 
it has an unexpected average coefficient sign. Together with the three core variables, these are our 
final list of robust determinants: The above ten geopolitical determinants, five economic determinants, 
plus the three core variables that are considered robust on the basis of the first application. All other 
variables are deemed fragile. These results are generally consistent with previous analyses and prior 
arguments. 
 
Our study has important implications for policies aimed at promoting FDI and, therefore, economic 
development. Openness suggests the need for governments to maintain economies open to 
international trade, fostering competition and innovation. Education at secondary and tertiary levels 
suggests the need for human capital to be promoted and skills and labour productivity more broadly to 
be developed. Government expenditures generally crowd out resources from the private sector, hence 
government spending is robust and negatively related to incoming FDI.
18
 At the same time, the need 
to maintain orderly public finances is highlighted by the presence of government debt, which is 
                                                 
18
This finding suggests that in countries with large government sectors such as the industrialised ones, there will 
be, ceteris paribus, a net outflow of FDI.  
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robustly negative; this is so as higher debt implies, ceteris paribus, higher future taxes. The role of 
this variable has not been highlighted in previous literature, although it plays a prominent role in 
public discourse. Internet usage and number of telephone lines are variables that signify both a 
developed internal market and a developed infrastructure. The role of government policy in 
maintaining the former was highlighted above; at the same time, government, in association with the 
private sector, also has a critical role to play in enhancing the latter. Furthermore, business taxation is 
important in maintain a thriving business environment, and here is another important role for 
government policy. Our results suggest that economic institutions and their quality matter in attracting 
FDI: democratic governance, avoidance of conflict as well as openness promote profitability, 
investment and incoming FDI. More broadly, institutional quality and quality of governance matters, 
as has been repeatedly affirmed in the context of growth analyses. Thus, we find a role for 
government policies with relevance at different horizons, from the short term (government spending, 
taxation) to the medium term (education, infrastructure) to the long term (taxation again, orderly 
public finances, institutional quality). In all, incoming FDI is considered as a key part of the process 
of development; our study identifies its key determinants and highlights several which leave a critical 
role to be played by government policy for their promotion.   
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Table 1: List of variables 
 
Variable code  Economic variable description Variable code Geopolitical variable description
19
 
(
FDI
Y
) 
Dependent variable : the ratio of 
inward FDI to GDP 
ARB Countries where main language is Arabic 
OPEN Trade openess index  
(imports+exports)/GDP 
BUREAU Bureaucracy  
INFL Inflation CONFLICTINT International conflict 
GDPP GDP per capita, PPP adjusted CORR Corruption rates 
GDPG GDP growth rate DEMO Democracy 
CAB Current account balance/GDP LAW Rule of law 
TTRADE Taxes on international trade  ETHNIC Ethnic tension 
CGD Central government debt/GDP COMMU Communist regime 
FDIO Foreign direct investment, net outflows 
(% of GDP) 
REPB Republic regime 
GCF Gross fixed capital formation/GDP  SURFACE Total surface area of the country 
GFE Government final  expenditure/GDP ENG Countries where main language is English 
GS Gross savings/GDP SPN Countries where main language is Spanish 
HMTAXCOR Highest marginal corporate tax  
 rate  
FRC Countries where main language is French 
INTERNET Internet users RTEAD Rate of administration efficiency 
INTSPRD Interest rate spread    PARL Parliamentary  regime 
LIQUID Liquid liabilities EAP East Asia and pacific regional dummy 
LIR Lending interest rate   ECA Europe and Central Asia regional dummy 
NRESERVE Total reserves (as % of GDP) LAC Latin America and Caribbean regional 
Dummy 
POPTL Total population  SSA Sub-Saharan African  regional dummy 
RAIL Rail lines  SA South Asia regional dummy 
RATIOP Primary school enrolment/labour force MENA Middle east and north Africa dummy 
RATIOS  Secondary school enrolment /labour 
force 
WTO Countries that are member of WTO 
RATIOT Tertiary school enrolment/labour force GASDUMMY Gas dummy variables 
REX Real exchange rate  LANDUNLOCKED Landunlocked country dummy 
RIR Real interest rate OILDUMMY Oïl dummy variable  
ROADS Roads, total network    GTBUN Total boundaries of the country exceed 3 
TAXPROFR Taxes on income, profits    SBUN Total boundaries of the country are below 
3 
TEL Telephone mainlines NOBUND No boundaries in this country 
TIMEB Time required to start a business    
UNEM Unemployment, total    
WGETOGDPL Wage to GDP ratio   
                                                 
19
Note: the geopolitical variables include country specific institutions, such as, democracy, rule of law, 
corruption, bureaucracy, international conflict and ethnic tension. According to the ICRG rating system criteria 
the highest value of a variable indicates the lowest potential risk for that component and the lowest value (0) 
indicates the highest potential risk. The remaining covariates are binary dummy variables for regional location, 
languages, political regime and natural resources. For example, the Arabic language dummy takes a value of 1 if 
the country is Arab speaking and zero otherwise. The same concept is applied to all of the remaining dummies. 
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Table 2: First EBA application with only economic variables - results for Open 
𝐈𝐤𝐢𝐭 AVG coeft. 𝐂𝐃𝐅(𝟎)
∗ 𝐂𝐃𝐅(𝟎) 
GDPP 0.059*** 0.986 0.999 
GDPG 0.053*** 0.983 0.997 
CAB 0.063*** 0.990 0.992 
CGD 0.914*** 0.994 1.000 
FDIO 0.056*** 0.993 0.998 
GCF 0.057*** 0.990 0.999 
GFE 0.059*** 0.992 1.000 
GS 0.063*** 0.992 0.999 
HMTAXCOR 0.108*** 0.984 0.998 
INTERNET 0.073*** 0.994 1.000 
INTRESPRD 0.064*** 0.991 0.999 
LIQUID 0.031** 0.906 0.951 
LIR 0.062*** 0.993 0.999 
NRESERVE 0.053** 0.929 0.972 
POPTL 0.069*** 0.985 0.998 
RAIL 0.072*** 0.981 0.996 
RATIOP 0.069*** 0.982 0.997 
RATIOS 0.068*** 0.980 0.995 
RATIOT 0.057*** 0.987 0.999 
REX 0.155*** 0.952 1.000 
RIR 0.062*** 0.992 0.999 
ROADS 0.044** 0.951 0.980 
TAXPROFR 0.061*** 0.991 0.999 
TEL 0.057*** 0.958 1.000 
TIMEB 0.020 0.672 0.607 
UNEM 0.091*** 0.999 1.000 
WGETOGDL 0.061*** 0.988 0.999 
Table 2 notes: The first column (headed "Ikit") reports the variable of interest used in the EBA application and 
the results relate to the core variable OPEN. “AVG coeft” represents each Ikit variable’s coefficient averaged 
over the number regressions used in the EBA application. Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) non-normal CDF is denoted 
“CDF(0)∗ and the normal CDF is “CDF(0)”. Bold emphasis indicates that a variable is robust (otherwise it is 
fragile) based upon Sala-i-Martin’s criteria. *** denotes robustness at the 0.99 level, ** at the 0.95 level and * at 
the 0.90 level. 
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Table 3: First EBA application with only economic variables - results for Infl 
𝐈𝐤𝐢𝐭 AVG coeft. 𝐂𝐃𝐅(𝟎)
∗ 𝐂𝐃𝐅(𝟎) 
GDPP -0.003 0.806 0.623 
GDPG -0.001 0.764 0.524 
CAB -0.003 0.813 0.605 
CGD -0.011 0.631 0.705 
FDIO -0.003 0.813 0.574 
GCF -0.002 0.797 0.571 
GFE -0.003 0.766 0.608 
GS -0.002 0.789 0.568 
HMTAXCOR -0.013 0.699 0.579 
INTERNET -0.001 0.837 0.827 
INTRESPRD -0.005 0.770 0.624 
LIQUID -0.007 0.832 0.827 
LIR -0.003 0.768 0.606 
NRESERVE -0.015 0.793 0.665 
POPTL -0.004 0.793 0.570 
RAIL -0.002 0.749 0.526 
RATIOP 0.001 0.770 0.524 
RATIOS -0.005 0.748 0.775 
RATIOT -0.020** 0.909 0.962 
REX -0.013 0.766 0.779 
RIR -0.004 0.598 0.656 
ROADS -0.004 0.812 0.570 
TAXPROFR -0.002 0.784 0.586 
TEL -0.004 0.805 0.583 
TIMEB 0.141 0.808 0.807 
UNEM -0.010 0.814 0.684 
WGETOGDL -0.005 0.611 0.682 
Table 3 notes: The first column (headed "Ikit") reports the variable of interest used in the EBA application and 
the results relate to the core variable INFL. All other labels are defined as in Table 2. Bold emphasis indicates 
that a variable is robust (otherwise it is fragile) based upon Sala-i-Martin’s criteria. *** denotes robustness at 
the 0.99 level, ** at the 0.95 level and * at the 0.90 level. 
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Table 4: First EBA application with only economic variables - results for Ttrade 
𝐈𝐤𝐢𝐭 AVG coeft. 𝐂𝐃𝐅(𝟎)
∗ 𝐂𝐃𝐅(𝟎) 
GDPP -0.002 0.736 0.712 
GDPG -0.001 0.754 0.503 
CAB -0.008 0.747 0.754 
CGD 0.696*** 0.956 1.000 
FDIO 0.002 0.756 0.616 
GCF 0.003 0.764 0.718 
GFE 0.009 0.758 0.560 
GS 0.002 0.750 0.510 
HMTAXCOR 0.034 0.665 0.636 
INTERNET 0.046 0.764 0.739 
INTRESPRD 0.014 0.770 0.581 
LIQUID -0.010 0.775 0.563 
LIR 0.013 0.750 0.577 
NRESERVE -0.006 0.744 0.522 
POPTL 0.040 0.670 0.694 
RAIL 0.005 0.759 0.520 
RATIOP 0.034 0.715 0.659 
RATIOS 0.047 0.723 0.668 
RATIOT 0.007 0.752 0.744 
REX 0.155 0.824 0.894 
RIR 0.013 0.753 0.579 
ROADS 0.058 0.766 0.779 
TAXPROFR -0.007 0.757 0.544 
TEL 0.063 0.845 0.854 
TIMEB -0.088 0.675 0.598 
UNEM 0.078 0.807 0.812 
WGETOGDL 0.028 0.740 0.653 
Table 4 notes: The first column (headed "Ikit") reports the variable of interest used in the EBA application and 
the results relate to the core variable TTRADE. All other labels are defined as in Table 2. Bold emphasis 
indicates that a variable is robust (otherwise it is fragile) based upon Sala-i-Martin’s criteria. *** denotes 
robustness at the 0.99 level, ** at the 0.95 level and * at the 0.90 level. 
 
 
  
  
 
24 
 
 
Table 5: First EBA application with only economic variables - results for 𝐈𝐤𝐢𝐭 
𝐈𝐤𝐢𝐭 AVG coeft. 𝐂𝐃𝐅(𝟎)
∗ 𝐂𝐃𝐅(𝟎) 
GDPP 0.004** 0.939 0.981 
GDPG 0.078* 0.917 0.931 
CAB -0.123*** 0.995 0.999 
HMTAXCOR -0.157** 0.940 0.981 
FDIO 0.055* 0.905 0.922 
GCF 0.057 0.835 0.817 
GFE -0.174*** 1.000 0.940 
RATIOT 0.018** 0.987 0.950 
RATIOS 0.355*** 0.995 1.000 
INTERNET -0.001 0.764 0.636 
INTRESPRD 0.019 0.753 0.679 
LIQUID 0.010 0.680 0.648 
LIR -0.004 0.751 0.579 
NRESERVE 1.8×10−12 0.682 0.544 
POPTL 0.008 0.749 0.558 
RAIL 0.001 0.679 0.600 
RATIOP -0.019 0.742 0.660 
CGD -0.005 0.700 0.585 
GS 4.03×10−12 0.733 0.718 
REX -0.015 0.720 0.715 
RIR -0.007 0.713 0.596 
ROADS 3.46×10−7 0.645 0.563 
TAXPROFR -0.041 0.840 0.842 
TEL 0.004 0.805 0.835 
TIMEB -0.025 0.760 0.741 
UNEM -0.104 0.744 0.771 
WGETOGDL 0.180 0.841 0.818 
Table 5 notes: The first column (headed "Ikit") reports the variable of interest used in the EBA application and 
the results relate toIkit. All other labels are defined as in Table 2. Bold emphasis indicates that a variable is 
robust (otherwise it is fragile) based upon Sala-i-Martin’s criteria. *** denotes robustness at the 0.99 level, ** at 
the 0.95 level and * at the 0.90 level. 
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Table 6: Second EBA application with economic and geopolitical variables - 𝐈𝐤𝐢𝐭 results 
𝐈𝐤𝐢𝐭 AVG coeft. 𝐂𝐃𝐅(𝟎)
∗ 𝐂𝐃𝐅(𝟎) Ikit AVG coeft. 𝐂𝐃𝐅(𝟎)
∗ 𝐂𝐃𝐅(𝟎) 
ARB 16.223*** 0.97 1.00 FDIO 0.733*** 0.985 1.000 
SA 19.505*** 0.98 1.00 CGD 0.696*** 0.983 1.000 
LANDUNLOCKED 0.696*** 0.95 1.000 CAB -0.123*** 0.995 0.999 
SPN 0.953** 0.965 0.961 INTERNET 0.010** 0.984 0.988 
GTBUN 1.162** 0.98 0.950 GDPP 0.004** 0.939 0.981 
EAP   4.371* 0.90 0.92 RATIOT -5.718** 0.907 0.950 
DEMO 0.340* 0.90 0.91 TEL 0.010* 0.919 0.944 
CONFLICTINT -0.216** 0.95 0.90 GDPG 0.078* 0.917 0.931 
OILDUMMY -3.332* 0.94 0.90 LIQUID 0.011 0.841 0.892 
GASDUMMY -3.213* 0.93 0.90 GCF 0.161 0.870 0.869 
 PARL -1.240 0.83 0.85 TAXPROFR -0.041 0.840 0.842 
LAW -1.189 0.88 0.85 POPTL 0.196 0.814 0.800 
ECA 2.494 0.81 0.80 HMTAXCOR -0.202 0.744 0.771 
ENG -2.039 0.81 0.78 RIR 0.017 0.583 0.716 
SBUN 1.944 0.74 0.77 REX -0.020 0.722 0.715 
SSA -2.040 0.77 0.76 UNEM  0.069 0.753 0.691 
REPB  0.127 0.77 0.72 TTRADE -0.021 0.753 0.684 
MENA -1.747 0.70 0.67 INTRESPRD 0.019 0.753 0.679 
ETHNIC -0.093 0.77 0.66 ROADS 8.509×10−7 0.647 0.649 
NOBUND -1.269 0.70 0.64 NRESERVE 5.989×10−11 0.708 0.626 
SURFACE 1.8×10−7 0.63 0.62 WGETOGDL -8.698 0.726 0.591 
LAC 0.847 0.75 0.61 LIR 0.004 0.696 0.579 
RTEAD 0.007 0.675 0.598 RAIL 7.076×10−6 0.655 0.574 
BUREAU 0.187 0.60 0.58 GS -4.309×10−13 0.670 0.568 
FRC 0.563 0.72 0.56 TIMEB -0.002 0.787 0.562 
WTO -0.898 0.74 0.56 INFL -0.005 0.668 0.560 
CORR 0.030 0.70 0.54 RATIOP 3.939×10−5 0.610 0.504 
COMMU 0.166 0.64 0.52     
Table 6 notes: The column headed "Ikit" reports the variable of interest used in the EBA application and the 
results relate toIkit. All other labels are defined as in Table 2. Bold emphasis indicates that a variable is robust 
(otherwise it is fragile) based upon Sala-i-Martin’s criteria. *** denotes robustness at the 0.99 level, ** at the 
0.95 level and * at the 0.90 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
